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Introduction
On December 15th 1995 the European Court of Justice in Luxemburg declared in
the Bosman Case that the existing transfer system in the European Union (EU
hereafter) was in conflict with article 39 of the EC-Treaty.2 Advocate-general
____________________
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2 Court of Justice, December 15th 1995, Case C-415/93, in Reports of Cases before the Court, 1995,
4921. Article 39 (ex Article 48) stated «1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured
within the Community. 2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration
and other conditions of work and employment. 3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations
justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health: (a) to accept offers of
employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this
purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the
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Carl Otto Lenz called for the abolishment of the transfer system in football, on the
ground that it «infringes the player’s freedom of movement» for one club to
demand payment from another before permitting the player to change employers.
He added that the European Football Federation (hereafter UEFA) had no right to
limit the number of foreign players that a team can put on the pitch.
Ever since then, sports success in European football is becoming concentrated
in some countries. The bigger market leagues such as England, Spain, Italy,
Germany and France, also known as the Big 5, are increasingly dominating
international competitions. More recently, teams from Russia and Ukraine are
becoming the main non Big 5 opponents. Some former historical major teams such
as Ajax Amsterdam, RSC Anderlecht or Celtic Glasgow to mention some, are
demoted to secondary teams on the international forum.
In this article we provide theoretical explanations and empirical evidence on
the evolution of competitive balance3 between national leagues in European Football
after the Bosman Case. Changing structures towards an open labour market in
separated product markets resulted in a competitive disadvantage for smaller market
leagues and their teams. Many sports economists, however, argued in the nineties
that the changing conditions in the labour market would have no impact on
competitive balance and the distribution of player talent. They used arguments
taken from US cases but neglected the typical structure of European professional
football. These same sports economists argued later on that a European Football
League with characteristics of the American professional sports league model
would be the solution for concentration tendencies in European football.
On the other side of the spectrum, other sports economists argued that an
American model with cross-subsidization is not compatible with the European
approach towards sports and the introduction of an open labour market would
result in a concentration of talent into the Big 5 as well as more recently in Eastern
European leagues with «new money». They stand for a limitation of the openness
of the labour market.
This article is structured as follows. First, we explain the Bosman Case
and provide an overview of the discussion whether it would have caused adverse
effects on competitive balance between national leagues in European football.
Next, we show that there are some structural differences between US and European
league structures, explaining why predictions on the competitive balance did not
come true. Moreover, structural changes within the labour market and the product
markets of European football magnified existing differences within European
____________________
administrative action; (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed
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Sportsmen in the EU Post Bosman, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2005.
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football and worsened competitive balance. We also provide some empirical
evidence on the concentration of player talent and on the concentration of sports
successes towards teams from the Big 5 leagues. In the penultimate section, we
discuss future options for European football and we conclude with some pathways
for future research.
1. The Bosman Case: No Harmful Side Effects?
A general principle of EU law is that discrimination on grounds of nationality
regarding EU citizens is illegal and that all citizens are allowed to work in other
EU countries under the same conditions. The consequence of the Bosman Case
was that all players at the end of their contract became agents that were free to
move at an international labour market. This resulted consequently in the fact that
clubs lost their monopsony power over players. On the contrary, market power
went to those players who could sell their talents to the team that offered the
highest wages. In combination with this power shift, European football faced the
elimination of the limitation of the number of foreign players which resulted in a
substantial migration of player talent. The Bosman Case made factor mobility of
labour possible and resulted in a reallocation of player talent.4
The arguments of the football federations and UEFA to defend the existing
transfer system were that transfer fees are a form of revenue sharing and
remuneration of assets and that without these financial compensations clubs would
eradicate youth development. Parrish and McArdle5 notice that the European
Court of Justice foresaw in its verdict alternative possibilities such as revenue
sharing and salary cap to maintain or even increase competitive balance. The
problem was that this kind of cross-subsidization would be difficult to implement in
the structures of European football. This is because open league structures are
historically embedded in European team sports. Moreover, UEFA and the national
federations never took these alternatives into concern.
The academic world, however, countered arguments on the probability of
concentration of player talent and decreasing competitive balance. Késenne,6 for
example, indicated that North-American sports economists, such as Scully7 and
____________________
4 See T. ERICSON, The Bosman Case. Effects of the Abolition of the Transfer Fee, in J. of Sp. Ec., vol.
1, 2000, 203-218; K. VAN DE MOORTELE, De Migraties van Profspelers in de Voetbalwereld, in De
Aardr., vol. 3-4, 2003, 79-86; T. DEJONGHE, Football in Belgium: from Centre to Semi-periphery:
Analyzing the Financial Ground, paper presented at the 7th IASE congress, Ottawa, June 18-21,
2005; T. DEJONGHE, Sport en Economie; een Aftrap, Arko Sports Media, Nieuwegein, 2007; W.
ANDREFF, Globalization of the Sports Economy, in Riv. Dir. Ec. Sport, vol. 4, n. 3, 2008, 13-31; R.
POLI, L. RAVENEL, Annual Review of the European Players’ Labour Market, Editions CIES-CERSOT,
Neuchâtel, 2008.
5 R. PARRISH, D. MCARDLE, Beyond Bosman: The European Union’s Influence upon Professional
Athletes’ Freedom of Movement, in Soc. and Soc., vol. 7, 2004, 403-419.
6 S. KÉSENNE, De Aangekondigde Dood Van het Belgische Voetbal, in Str., vol. 65, 1998, 511-519.
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Quirk and Fort,8 analyzed the elimination in 1976 of the reserve clause in the US,
a system comparable to the transfer system before Bosman, in the Major League
Baseball (MLB). Their conclusion, based on existing theoretical and empirical
studies, was that professional leagues in the US would benefit if limitations on
freedom of players movement were eliminated.
The distribution of player talent in a market equilibrium is, according to
Quirk and Fort,9 related to the market size of the clubs. Their central argument
came from Rottenberg’s article10 that anticipated on the Coase theorem. In his
famous 1960 article,11 Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase argued that with zero
transaction costs, private and social costs will be equal. In other words, in a world
without transaction costs, bargaining in an unrestricted market leads to optimal
economic efficiency. Rottenberg argued that a limitation through a reserve clause
would not prevent migration of talent towards major teams. In Coase’s terms the
distribution of resources, in this case player talent, would not be affected by the
distribution of ownership rights. Translation of these theoretical findings to
professional sports means that free movement of players will have no effect on
their distribution and was defined as the invariance principle.12
This North American approach was used as an argument to demonstrate
that the Bosman Case would have no impact on distribution of talent in Europe.
Késenne13 argued:
«Along with the North American sports economists, who can
look back on an experience of more than twenty years with an
open players market, I believe that the abolition of the transfer
system in sports is a good thing. There is plenty of scientific
evidence on the fact that there is no connection between
limitations on players mobility and competitive balance in
leagues».14
The problem was that the European professional team sports environment did not
fulfil the main criteria of Rottenberg namely
«Markets in which the freedom to buy and to sell is constrained
by the reserve rule or by the suggested alternatives to it do not
promise better results than do markets constructed on the
postulate of freedom. It appears that free markets would give
as good aggregate results as any other kind of market for
industries, like the baseball industry, in which all firms must be
____________________
8 J. QUIRK, J. R. FORT, Pay Dirt: the Business of Professional Team Sports, Princeton University
Press, Princeton NJ, 1992.
9 J. QUIRK, J. R. FORT, Pay Dirt: the Business of Professional Team Sports,  cit., 8.
10 S. ROTTENBERG, The Baseball Player’s Labour Market, in J. of Pol. Ec., vol. 64, 1956, 242-258.
11 R. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in J. of L. and Ec., vol. 3, 1960, 1-44.
12 See M. EL HODIRI, J. QUIRK, An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League, in J. of Pol. Ec.,
vol. 79 , n. 6, 1971, 1320-1319.
13 S. KÉSENNE, De Aangekondigde Dood Van het Belgische Voetbal, cit., 6.
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nearly equal if each is to prosper».15
Even stronger: Szymanski16 recently declared after looking into a number of
empirical studies that «this meta-data is hardly a ringing endorsement for the
invariance principle, since “no effect” is reported in only seven out of twenty
MLB studies that he investigated». This means that even in the MLB this
theoretical framework can not been fully supported. Today, more than a decade
after the introduction of the Bosman Case, we notice that the Rottenberg-Coase
theorem did not hold for professional team sports in Europe. To underline this
argument, we will show that from the start on the differences between the
European football structure and the MLB indicated that the free agency principle
would have substantial consequences for the distribution of players between
leagues.
Throughout the last decade, the Rottemberg-Coase doctrine has been
contested by sports economists such as Downward & Dawson,17 Bougheas &
Downward18 and Moorhouse.19 Ericson20 argued that the source of inefficiency
in a free-agency market of football players is created by free riding of large teams
on the talent development in minor teams. This kind of free riding could however
be mitigated by transfer fees for players at the end of their contract. A fundamental
fact that the court did not consider, at least not explicitly, is that football players do
not move around in a common market as long as there are independent leagues.
This implies that smaller national leagues in particular cannot afford to keep their
most talented players in a free-agency market. Consequently, the transfer fee can
be motivated as an instrument to stimulate development of talent in small-market
teams. Haan, Koning and Van Witteloostuijn21 warned that free movement of
players could be the death penalty for many European leagues. According to them
international differences will increase and international competition will become
less exciting.22
____________________
15 S. ROTTENBERG, The Baseball Player’s Labour Market, cit., 10.
16 S. SZYMANSKI, The Champions League and the Coase Theorem, in Scottish J. of Pol. Ec., vol. 54,
2007, 355-373.
17 P. DOWNWARD, A. DAWSON, The Economics of Professional Team Sports, Routledge, London,
2000.
18 S. BOUGHEAS, P. DOWNWARD, The Economics of Professional Sports Leagues: Some Insights on the
Reform of Transfer Markets, in J. of Sp. Ec., vol. 2, 2003, 87-107.
19 See H. MOORHOUSE, Football post Bosman: the Real Issues, in C. Jeanrenaud, S. Késenne (eds.),
Competition Policy in Professional Sport: Europe after the Bosman Case, Standaard Uitgeverij,
Antwerp, 1999, 161-180; H. MOORHOUSE, The Distribution of Income in European Football: Big
Clubs, Small Countries, Major Problems, in C.P. Barros, M. Ibrahimo and S. Szymanski (eds.),
Transatlantic Sport: the Comparative Economics of North American and European Sports, Edward
Elgar Pub, Northampton, 2002, 69-108.
20 T. ERICSON, The Bosman Case. Effects of the Abolition of the Transfer Fee, cit., 4.
21 M. HAAN, R. KONING, A. VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Market Forces in European Soccer, Universiteit
Groningen, SOM Research Reports n. 02F18, 2002.
22 Later on, formal models were developed to explain the divergence between leagues in a win
maximizing environment : see S. KÉSENNE, The Peculiar International Economics of Professional
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2. Structural Differences and Developments
2.1 Structural differences between US and European league structures
There are some structural differences between US and European league structures.
We present a short discussion of the main differences that have consequences on
the relation between labour and product markets.23
Firstly, there is no significant rival league abroad for the main American
professional sports leagues such as the Major League Baseball (MLB), the
National Football League (NFL) and in a lesser degree the National Basketball
Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL). In European football,
however, a player can migrate from one league to another. The result is an increasing
competition between and within leagues on the labour market, while their product
markets remain largely separated. This means that labour and product markets in
Europe are different from their American counterparts. Teams are located in a
country and have to play in their national competition. Since revenues in European
football depend mainly and increasingly on media income, separated product
markets result in a competitive disadvantage for teams located in smaller markets.24
Secondly, US leagues are a closed profit maximizing league of teams granted
a territorial monopoly with limitations on franchise numbers and eligibility of the
size of a city to host a franchise. In Europe leagues are open and more win
maximising oriented. Promotion and relegation in a pyramidal hierarchical structure
between leagues in a country on different levels is embedded in the European
football tradition. This results in a blocking of cross-subsidization within and between
national leagues because it would on the one hand increase the probability of
relegation for major teams while on the other hand these major teams are in need
of high budgets to qualify and have a competitive team for European competitions.
There exists, however, some form of revenue sharing when it comes to broadcasting
rights in national leagues and marketing revenues in the European Champions
League. But even in the Champions League 50% of the total amount of money is
divided according to the market size of the countries where clubs are located.
____________________
have not been developed before the Bosman Case was implemented.
23 See in detail W. ANDREFF, P. STAUDOHAR, European and US Sports Business Models, in C.P. Barros,
M. Ibrahimo and S. Szymanski (eds.), Transatlantic Sport: the Comparative Economics of North
American and European Sports, Edward Elgar Pub, Northampton, 2002, 23-49; T. DEJONGHE, T.
TROELSEN, The Need of Competitive Balance in European Professional Soccer: A Lesson to Be
Learned from the North American Professional Leagues, in G. Papanikos (ed.), An Amalgam of
Sports and Exercise Research, Atiner, Piraeus, 2006, 35-54; T. DEJONGHE, Sport en Economie; een
Aftrap, cit., 4; P. DOWNWARD, A. DAWSON,  T. DEJONGHE, Economics of Sport: Theory, Evidence and
Policy, cit., 3.
24 Actually, there is an asymmetry in the degree by which product markets within professional
football are separated. An increasing globalization of football, fostered by the UEFA Champions
League, enables major teams from major leagues to attract fans from other countries as well. This
causes a magnification effect in favor of these teams, resulting in a further decrease of competitive
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Cross-subsidization such as revenue sharing, salary cap and some other
measures were introduced in the American system. Teams located in bigger markets
share some of their revenues with teams from smaller markets to increase
competitive balance in the league. They sometimes even pay a kind of luxury tax
when their relative or nominal salary rate is too high. The uncertainty of outcome
and competitive balance are central issues in US professional team sports. This
kind of cross subsidization was the solution proposed by North American oriented
sports economists. The European structure of professional football, however, is
totally different because of the existence of relegation and supranational UEFA
competitions for teams.
2.2 Changes in the labour market
The Bosman Case created a shift in market power at the labour market. Teams
lost their monopsony position and many players became monopolists. The shift of
bargaining power from clubs towards players resulted in an increasing competition
to attract the best player talents. Win maximizing teams lost their power and ended
up with financial problems because of an inter and intra league competition
combined with policies aiming at short term success. The reason is that according
to Dawson & Downward25 and Késenne26 teams in a win maximizing environment
will overpay their players, with potential adverse implications that may explain
some of the financial problems in European football. Football in Europe evolved
from somewhat profit maximising national monopsony leagues towards a set of
win-maximising leagues that operate in a unified open player talent market.27
Because there was not any foreign competitive competition for major US
leagues, the combination of profit maximizing clubs in a labour market with a fixed
number of talents in a common product market results, according to Quirk and
Fort ,28 into a Walrasian equilibrium. In European football, the opening of the labour
market made the number of talents variable. This caused an increasing competition
between clubs to stay competitive within their league and, at the European level,
between clubs of different leagues. In this setting, strategic interaction at the
labour market occurs, so game theoretical considerations come into play.
2.3 Changes in the product market
In win maximizing European leagues all teams try to maximize their performance
on the pitch. Under these conditions teams with higher budgets hire more and
____________________
25 P. DOWNWARD, A. DAWSON, The Economics of Professional Team Sports, Routledge, London, cit.,
17.
26 S. KÉSENNE, The Monopsonistic Player Market in a Win-Maximising League, in Eur. Sp. Man.
Qu., vol. 2, 2002, 180-187.
27 P. DOWNWARD, A. DAWSON, T. DEJONGHE, Economics of Sport: Theory, Evidence and Policy, cit., 3.
28 J. QUIRK, J. R. FORT, Pay Dirt: the Business of Professional Team Sports, cit., 8.48                                                                                                Trudo Dejonghe – Wim Van Opstal
better players to increase their probability to win. Increasing competitiveness within
and between leagues results in a foot drain of player talent towards the main
leagues.29
The main variable that gives long term assurance of sports successes is the
total turnover of the club.30 Until the nineties the financial structure of professional
football was what Andreff & Staudohar31 referred to as the traditional Spectator-
Subsidies-Sponsors-Local or SSSL-model. The main sources of revenues of the
clubs were ticketing, local subsidies and local sponsors. The changing structure
and environment of European professional football forced major clubs and leagues
to change their structures to a more encompassing Media-Corporations-
Merchandising-Markets-Global model (MCMMG-model). The clubs and leagues
became a broader economic product with broadcasting rights and sponsorship as
the main sources of income.
In 1983 the BBC paid £2.6 million to cover the league on television. In
2005/06 the total turnover of the English Premier League stood at €1.974 billion
with €839 million from broadcasting rights, €655 million from match day revenues
and €500 million from sponsoring according to Deloitte.32 In a recent broadcasting
deal for the period 2007-2010 Sky is paying £1.314 billion, Setanta £392 million,
foreign broadcasting rights £625 million and internet and mobile telephone providers
£400 million or £910.33 million a year. The total turnover of the Premier League in
2007/08 is estimated on €2.555 billion.33 Deloitte estimated the market size of
European football in 2008 on €14.6 billion. The turnover of Big 5 European leagues
tripled since 1995/96 and represent €7.7 billion or 53% of this amount. The newly
signed media contract of €4.2 billion for the period 2007/08-2009/10 in the English
Premier League indicates that the market power of this league will even probably
increase. This results probably in a domination of the Premier League towards
____________________
29 See P. DARBY, The New Scramble for Africa: African Football Migration to Europe, in J. Mangan,
(ed.), Europe, Sport, World: Shaping Global Societies, Frank Cass, London, 2001, 217-244; K. VAN
DE MOORTELE, De Migraties van Profspelers in de Voetbalwereld, cit., 4; T. DEJONGHE, Football in
Belgium: from Centre to Semi-periphery: Analyzing the Financial Ground, cit., 4; T. DEJONGHE,
Sport en Economie: een Noodzaak Tot Symbiose, Arko Sportsmedia, Nieuwegein, 2004; R. POLI, L.
RAVENEL, Annual Review of the European Players’ Labour Market, cit., 4.
30 See S. SZYMANSKI, T. KUYPERS, Winners and losers, the business strategy of football, Penguin
Books, London, 1999; S. DOBSON, J. GODDARD, The Economics of Football, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2001; S. HALL, S. SZYMANSKI, A. ZIMBALIST, Testing Causality between Team
Performance and Payroll. The Cases of Major League Baseball and English Soccer, in J. of Sp. Ec.,
vol. 3, 2002, 149-168; T. DEJONGHE, Sport en Economie: een Noodzaak Tot Symbiose, cit., 29; T.
DEJONGHE, Sport en Economie; een Aftrap, cit., 4; DELOITTE, Annual Review of Football Finance,
Deloitte and Touche and Tohmasu, Manchester, 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; T. DEJONGHE, H.
VANDEWEGHE, Belgian Football, in Journal of Sports Economics, vol. 7, 2006, 105-113.
31 W. ANDREFF, P. STAUDOHAR, European and US Sports Business Models, cit., 23.
32 DELOITTE, Annual Review of Football Finance, Deloitte and Touche and Tohmasu, Manchester,
2007.
33 See The Premier League Negotiates New Overseas TV Deal, The Associated Press, January 18th,
2007; DELOITTE, Annual Review of Football Finance, Deloitte and Touche and Tohmasu, Manchester,
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other leagues of the Big 5. Smaller but historical successful leagues such as Belgium,
The Netherlands, Portugal and Scotland have a comparative disadvantage, because
total turnover of these leagues amounts only to €1.17 billion.
The result was that clubs located in bigger product markets, and thus
broadcasting markets, had a comparative advantage over clubs located in smaller
product markets. Competition between European teams transformed from team
level towards league level and resulted, as predicted theoretically by Haan, Koning
and Van Witteloostuijn,34 in a gradually decreasing role for historical major teams
such as Ajax Amsterdam, RSC Anderlecht or Celtic Glasgow, to mention some in
European competitions. Competition between separated product markets in a win
maximizing environment resulted after 1995 in an increasing domination of clubs
from the big markets in Spain, Italy, England and in a lesser degree Germany and
France.
In the latest years, divergence of broadcasting revenues increased between
Big 5 leagues and other leagues because of a restructuring of the Champions
League market pool. From 1991, when the Champions League was created, until
1999 UEFA divided 75% of their Champions League marketing revenues according
to performances on the pitch. This implied that the remuneration for a victory, tie
or loss was independent of the country of a team. In 1999 the Big 5 demanded
(and obtained) another system of Champions League revenue sharing. From 1999
on the distribution system changed the share that went to the 32 teams participating
at the Champions League. Since then, a share of 50% (of this 75%) is being
distributed according to the value of each TV market represented by the
participating teams. Needless to say that this modification favoured teams from
bigger markets (the Big 5). Introducing this market pool was forced by the major
leagues. UEFA was anxious that major teams would create an alternative European
Football League (EFL)35 sponsored by media groups. As a result financial
divergence between Big 5 and other leagues increased and the only minor form of
revenue sharing was partly eliminated.
In sum, recent modifications in the product market have lead to a
transformation of the competition structure between the Big 5 and the rest of the
leagues towards a Stackelberg equilibrium in the labour market. Clubs from the
Big 5 are market leaders that have the greatest market power and attract in a win
maximizing environment the best player talents. On the long term this reinforces a
concentration of player talents and results in increasing win percentages of teams
____________________
34 M. HAAN, R. KONING, A. VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Market Forces in European Soccer, cit., 21.
35 Media Partners wanted to create this league in 1998. Their idea was a closed revenue sharing
league with 16 or 32 teams. Arsenal, Manchester United, Liverpool, Juventus, Inter Milan, AC
Milan, Bayern München, Borussia Dortmund, Panathinaikos, Galatasaray, Benfica, Paris St
Germain, Marseille, Ajax Amsterdam, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona would play in the closed
highest division of EFL. The second division consisted out of teams that qualified themselves by
performing well in their national competition. Rupert Murdoch, Leo Kirch, Silvio Berlusconi and
Al Waleed Bin Talal were the potential investors and JP Morgan Bank, Slaughter & May and Media
Partners would manage the competition.50                                                                                                Trudo Dejonghe – Wim Van Opstal
from the Big 5 when they play against teams from other competitions. Leagues in
smaller markets such as The Netherlands, Belgium, Scotland and Portugal moved
gradually towards an inferior position in Europe. Their major teams could or can in
some degree still compete on a level just below that of teams of the Big 5. These
leagues transformed themselves into stepping stone leagues where player talents
are educated and sold to teams of the major leagues.36 This still creates enough
revenues to be able to outcompete many other leagues with similar market sizes,
but is convicts them to a secondary position. A third specific category of leagues
that arises in European football are so-called oligarchic leagues, indicating
alternative financing by local oligarchs and regional politicians in some former
Communist countries. More specifically, Ukraine and Russia are two countries
that are most characterised by these practices.37
3. Empirical Evidence
3.1 An increased concentration of players talent
We already mentioned that opening the labour market would increase the
concentration of players talent which would result in a decreasing competitive
balance between national leagues. To evaluate increasing concentration of players
talent we compared the leagues of players participating at the US World Cup
1994 and the Germany World Cup 2006. World Cup 94 took place before the
Bosman Case opened the labour market in EU professional football. Data on
national teams at these World Cups are publicly available on the internet.38 To
eliminate the potential influence by a change in the set of qualified countries at the
World Cups of 1994 and 2006 we selected the 11 countries39 that were present at
both World Cups. In 1994, 43% of all players of these selected squads played in
Big 5 leagues, compared to 50% in 2006. The share of stepping stone leagues
moved from 9.5% towards 9.1%. If we eliminate players performing in their own
league, we also see an increase in the proportion of immigrant players that moved
to Big 5 leagues from 18.2% in 1994 to 25.3% in 2006. For stepping stone leagues,
this proportion hardly evolved, namely from 3.7% to 3.6%.40
____________________
36 T. DEJONGHE, Sport en Economie; een Aftrap, cit., 4.
37 Some examples are Yevgeni Giner (Sibnel) and Abramovich in CSKA Moscow, German Tkachenkov
(former owner of metal companies) in Krylia Sovetov Samara, Leonid Fedun (Lukoil) in Spartak
Moscow, Vladimir Alliochin (Torpedo Moscow), Zenith Sint Petersburg (owned by Gazprom),
Ihor Surkis (Dynamo Kiev), Serhiy Taratu (FC Metalurh Donetsk), and Rinat Akhmetov (Shaktar
Donetsk). See F. FOER, How Soccer Explains the World, an Unlikely Theory of Globalization, New
York, Harper Collins Publisher, 2004; J. WILSON, Behind the Curtain, Travels in Eastern European
Football, London, Orion Books, 2006.
38 See www.planetworldcup.com/CUPS/1994/wc94squads.html and www.planetworldcup.com/
CUPS/2006/wc06squads.html.
39 Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, USA, Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Saudi-Arabia and South-Korea.
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Using other data, Poli & Ravenel41 analyzed the percentage of players that
played at least once for their own national team. In 2007/08, the Big 5 average of
this percentage was 45.0% with 66.2% for the Premier League (England). To
name yet another figure, in 2007/08, the percentage of internationals in top 5 clubs
of each league from the Big 5 was 64.6%. This increasing concentration of players
talent would have to result in a decreasing competitive balance between national
leagues in European football.
3.2 A decreased competitive balance between leagues
A method to find evidence on a decreasing competitive balance is to evaluate the
evolution of the UEFA National Association Coefficient. This coefficient measures
the performance of teams from an association in European Cups during the last
five seasons. This coefficient is determined by the results of the clubs of the
leagues in UEFA Champions League and Europe League games over the past
five seasons. The UEFA National Association Coefficient is computed by adding
up the results of the last 5 years. In those five years each team gets two points for
a win and one point for a draw. The number of points awarded each season (two
for each win by a club from that league, one for a draw) is divided by the number
of teams that participated for that nation in that season. This number is then rounded
to three decimal places. Points in qualification matches are halved: one point for a
win and half a point for a draw. From 2005 on, one bonus point is allocated for
reaching the quarter final, the semi final and the final of the UEFA cup. Reaching
the group stage of the Champions League yields 3 bonus points. Also qualification
for the first knock-out round of the Champions League yields 1 bonus points. The
gini-coefficient of this variable increased from 23.3 in 1994/95 to 27.5 in 2008/09,
which already indicates an increasing concentration of sports success and a decline
of competitive balance.
3.2.1 Specification
We apply a multiple regression analysis (OLS) on 1994/95 data and on 2008/09
data and compare the conditional mean of performance of the Big 5 leagues,
controlling for market size. At the same time, it allows us to evaluate the position
of some other special cases as well. As mentioned before, some leagues have
specific characteristics with respect to broadcasting rights, one of the main revenue
resources in professional football. In Big 5 leagues, these broadcasting rights are
extremely important and give teams of these leagues a competitive advantage
over other leagues in Europe, as discussed in previous sections. The problem is
that these data are not available for all federations. Therefore, we use dummy
____________________
players in Big 5 leagues is significant at the 5%-level (p = 0.0277, one-sided test), while this
proportion remains stable for stepping stone leagues (p = 0.9235, two-sided test).
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variables. A first dummy, BIG5, identifies England, Spain, Italy, Germany and
France. We expect not only a high and significant coefficient for this dummy, we
also expect a significant increase of this coefficient between 1994/95 and
2008/09.
Another dummy variable, STEPPINGSTONE, indicates The Netherlands,
Portugal, Belgium and Scotland, which we denoted in previous sections as stepping
stone leagues. Major clubs of these countries belonged historically to the top in
European competitions, but moved gradually towards a secondary position. We
expect the coefficient of this dummy to be positive because of the historical strong
performance of these countries. Therefore, these countries have relative high
broadcasting rights both in 1994/95 and 2008/09 in comparison with other non Big
5 countries. Nevertheless, we do not expect an increase in this coefficient between
1994/95 and 2008/09.
OLIGARCH indicates Ukraine and Russia, the two countries that are
affected the most by alternative financing of local oligarchs and regional politicians
in some former Communist countries. We predict a non significant relation with
the dependent variable in 1994/95 and a positive significant coefficient for this
dummy variable in 2008/09.
While our focus is on the relative performance of these three groups, indicated
by dummy variables, we want to control for market size as well. This may give a
(weak) indication of the impact of the opening of the labour market on these
leagues ceteris paribus the role of the market size they operate in. We capture
market size by the natural log of gross domestic product per capita and by the
natural log of population size, indicated by variables ln(GDP/CAPITA) and
ln(POPULATION). While both variables are an indicator of potential revenues
for teams, sponsors and media, population captures the pool for home grown talent
as well. We expect that both variables will have a significant positive impact on
the UEFA National Association Coefficient. This results in the following regression
equation:
UEFA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION COEFFICIENTi = β 0 + β 1ln(GDP/CAPITAi) +
β 2ln(POPULATIONi) + β 3BIG5i + β 4STEPPINGSTONEi + β 5OLIGARCHi +  ε i
where i indexes each country. We compare its estimates for the 1994/95 season
with those of the 2008/09 season.
3.2.2 Data
We make use of the UEFA National Association Coefficient of the 1994/95 season,
the last season before the Bosman Case, and the most recent ranking from
2008/09. For the former season, these data were available for 47 federations,
while for the latter season we have data on 53 federations. Montenegro, however,
is a member of UEFA for less than five years, so we use 52 observations for the
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manipulations.  We divided results of Yugoslavia (until 1992/93), USSR (1991/92)
and CSSR (1992/93) into the results of their descendant countries if they were a
member of UEFA in 1995. We looked into the clubs that were responsible for the
UEFA National Association Coefficient and allocated these results to their new
countries.
Population and GDP/capita data were taken from the IMF for the years
1994 and 2008. Data on GDP per capita are expressed in PPP International USD
in constant prices (with 2000 as a base year). For the UK, we had to construct
separate but comparable data for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
These calculations were based on population and GDP data of the Office of National
Statistics.42 To construct comparable GDP/capita for Malta, we had to complement
IMF data with data from the World Development Indicators. Comparable data
were not available, however, for very small countries like San Marino, Andorra,
the Faroe Islands and Liechtenstein, so these countries where dropped from our
sample.
Finally, our dataset consists of 45 observations for 1994/95 and 48
observations for 2008/09. In order not to grasp spurious effects we rescaled the
1994/95 UEFA National Association Coefficient such that its total is equal to that
of the 2008/09 data. Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the ratio scale
variables in our dataset.
3.2.3 Results
Results are shown in table 2. We apply Huber-White-sandwich standard errors to
correct for heteroskedasticity43 with a correction proposed by Davidson &
MacKinnon44 for small samples.45 Collinearity diagnostics signal potential
collinearity problems for both regressions, but this would only bias standard errors
____________________
42 See www.ons.gov.uk.
43 The Breusch-Pagan test reports a test statistic of 13.08 for the 1994/95 regression and of 6.76 for
the 2008/09 regression. So, we can reject the assumption of homoskedasticity (p < 0.01).
44 R. DAVIDSON, J. MACKINNON, Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, 2nd ed., Oxford University
Press, New York, 1993.
45 This method divides the square of the calculated residuals by (1 – hjj)² while calculating the
standard errors, where hjj 
th  is the j  diagonal element of the hat (projection) matrix.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
  Mean Stdev Q25 Q50 Q75 Total 
UEFA National Association Coefficient 94/95  20.7  19.8  5.7  16.0  28.7  992.9 
UEFA National Association Coefficient 08/09  20.7  19.4  6.7  14.7  28.0  992.9 
ln(GDP/CAPITA) 1994  9.3  0.9  8.7  9.6  10.0  426.6 
ln(GDP/CAPITA) 2008  9.7  0.7  9.2  9.9  10.3  467.7 
ln(POPULATION)  1994  8.8  1.4 8.2 8.7 9.6  407.1 
ln(POPULATION)  2008  8.9  1.4 8.1 8.9 9.5  425.9 
 54                                                                                                Trudo Dejonghe – Wim Van Opstal
against our hypothesis.46 Moreover, the correlation between ln(GDP/CAPITA)
and ln(POPULATION), which are the only two ratio scale covariates in our model,
only amounts to -0.0494 for 1994 and to -0.0559 for 2008.
The results in table 2 show an increasing positive coefficient for the BIG 5 and the
OLIGARCH dummies.47 Controlling for market size, we see, as expected, that
BIG 5 leagues have a disproportional high, and significantly increasing UEFA
National Association Coefficient. Also STEPPINGSTONE leagues have a score
that is significantly higher than the other leagues, both in 1994/95 and 2008/09.
This can be explained by their strong historical position, combined with the fact
that some of their clubs enjoy Champions League market pool revenues as well,
albeit only marginally compared to clubs from BIG 5 leagues. We notice that this
coefficient did not change significantly. As expected, the OLIGARCH dummy
proved not to be significant in 1994/95, while its coefficient increased significantly
in 2008/09. While the coefficients of ln(GDP/CAPITA) and ln(POPULATION)
appear to be significant for both years, we notice a significant decrease of both
coefficients.
____________________
46 See C. BAUM, An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata, Stata Press, College Station,
2006.
47 In order to test for the equality of regression coefficients, we applied a t-test, as proposed by R.
PATERNOSTER, R. BRAME, P. MAZEROLLE, A. PUQUERO, Using the Correct Statistical Test for the
Equality of Regression Coefficients, in Crim., vol. 36, 1998, 859-866.
Table 2: Regression estimates  
 
Dependent variable: UEFA National Association Coefficient  




































n 45  48 
Prob. > F  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Maximum VIF  1.98  1.96 
Mean VIF  1.54  1.49 
Condition Number (scaled variables)  36.71  44.72 
R²  0.8649 0.8440 
OLS, modified Huber-White-sandwich standard errors between brackets
  
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 Competitive Balance between National Leagues in European Football after the Bosman Case          55
4. Future Options
In this paper, we provided theoretical explanations and empirical evidence on a
divergence of sports success between national leagues in European football. The
main reason for this divergence is the opening of the labour market with migrating
players in a separated win maximizing product markets with almost no revenue
sharing. Some sports economists see a solution in a further Americanisation of
European football, resulting in a European Major League Football that resembles
the European Football League format of 1998, with one of more semi closed
divisions and forms of cross subsidization such as salary cap and revenue sharing.
According to them this evolution is inevitable as this would reduce the gap between
major and smaller leagues.48 From an economic viewpoint creating an European
Major League Football would be the natural outcome of the transformation of
locally embedded football into a more business and media oriented entertainment.
This idea, however, stands in opposite of European football culture. Bale49
and Dejonghe50 already mentioned the importance of strong relations with local
communities, called topophilia, and the existence of historical traditions and rivalries
in every country. Dobson and Goddard51 also notice that those in favour of a total
withdrawal of major teams from their domestic league underestimate the importance
of domestic history and tradition as typical characteristics of football identity in
Europe. Arnaud52 refers also to the tradition of the football fan who wants a twin-
pillar structure consistent of a national competition and an European competition.
In sum, local embedment and identity are defining characteristics of European
professional football.
Instead of an Americanisation we address some other solutions. We could
merge product markets to some degree by creating some regional leagues or we
could close the labour market to a certain degree. The first solution, merging
product markets by the creation of regional leagues, has been proposed already
____________________
48 See S. KÉSENNE, Opbrengstendeling en marktregulering in professionele ploegsporten, in Ec. en
Soc. Tijd.,  vol. 52, 1998, 35-49; S. KÉSENNE, The Peculiar International Economics of Professional
Football in Europe, cit., 22; T. HOEHN, S. SZYMANSKI, European Football: the Structure of Leagues
and Revenue Sharing, in Ec. Pol., vol. 14, 1999, 204-240; S. SZYMANSKI, T. KUYPERS, Winners and
losers, the business strategy of football, cit., 30; R. NOLL, Competition Policy in Professional Sports
after the Bosman Case, in C. Jeanrenaud, S. Késenne (eds.), Competition Policy in Professional
Sport: Europe after the Bosman Case, Standaard Uitgeverij, Antwerp, 1999, 17-44; S. DOBSON, J.
GODDARD, The Economics of Football, cit., 30; C. DURAND, L. RAVENEL, E. BAYLE, The Strategic and
Political Consequences of Using Demographic Criteria for the Organisation of European Leagues,
in European Journal of Sport Science, vol. 5, 2005, 167-180; U. LAGO, R. SIMMONS, S. SZYMANSKI,
The Financial Crisis in European Football, in J. of Sp. Ec., vol. 7, 2006, 3-12.; A. BARONCELLI, U.
LAGO, Italian Football, in J. of Sp. Ec., vol. 7, 2006, 13-28.
49 J. BALE, Space, Place and Body Culture: Yi-Fu Tuan and a Geography of Sport, in Geogr- An., vol,
78B, n. 3, 1996, 163-171.
50 T. DEJONGHE, Sport in de Wereld: Ontstaan, Evolutie en Verspreiding, Academia Press, Gent,
2001.
51 S. DOBSON, J. GODDARD, The Economics of Football, cit., 30.
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product markets by the creation of regional leagues, has been proposed already
by smaller leagues themselves. In 1998, some major teams53 from the stepping
stone leagues tried to create an Atlantic League (later on Euro League, including
teams from Norway, Denmark and Sweden as well). The aim of this regional
league was to strengthen the financial position of their clubs through broadcasting
rights while holding their traditional and historical position in a European context.
They believed in a transnational league of big clubs from smaller leagues so that
they could compete with teams from the Big 5. UEFA, however, rejected this
proposal, and argued that the Bosman Case had no effect on competitive balance
and that national leagues are a defining characteristic of the European sports
structure. In this system, the number of leagues in Europe would decrease and the
financial gap with the Big 5 would decrease. Another example of regionalisation
of leagues is the idea of a Bene League, combining the best teams of Belgium and
The Netherlands. This phantom appears occasionally in the media or in debates
but has never been taken serious. A Bene League, however, would take concerns
of local embedment and identity better into account than the geographically and
culturally hybrid concept of an Euro League.
The second solution, closing the labour market to some degree, means a
limitation on the number of foreign players in national leagues. In the last years
some new attempts to restrict players mobility, such as compensation systems of
youth players and 6 + 5 or home grown rules, were launched. Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (hereafter FIFA) advocates the 6 + 5 rule,
which basically states that a team must start with at least six players that should
be eligible for the national team of the country in which the club is located. FIFA
Chairman Sepp Blatter recently argued that hiring an increasing number of foreign
players results in a loss of the local, regional en even national identity of clubs.54
Young players lose, according to Blatter, their motivation to practice and rich clubs
brought a two-tier competition in many countries with only a few teams with a lot
of foreign talents playing for the title. Blatter wanted to convince the EU to refer
to the specificity of sports in the new European Treaty. With this rule FIFA opposed
the UEFA home grown rule, which sets a quota of locally-trained players without
discrimination on grounds of nationality. Blatter’s proposal, however, is unworkable
in the EU because it contravenes EU laws on the free movement of labour and
creates a direct discrimination based on nationality. The European Parliament voted
against the 6 + 5 rule in a resolution adopted on May 8th 2008.
The home grown rule on the other hand, where clubs are obliged to have a
certain number of players between the age of 15 and 21 years who have been
trained locally during at least three years, does not imply discrimination based on
nationality. It only protects locally trained players and was supported by European
____________________
53 Ajax, Feyenoord and PSV (The Netherlands), RSC Anderlecht (Belgium), Celtic and Glasgow
Rangers (Scotland) and FC Porto and Benfica (Portugal).
54 Yes in principle to 6+5 rule, see www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/bodies/media/
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Parliament. This rule would ensure investments in grass roots youth development.
Some sports economists, however, declare that introducing these labour market
limitations would result in a return to the Pre Bosman era. As could be expected,
some English clubs from the Premier League protested against this rule as well.
FC Liverpool manager Rafael Benitez criticised this rule and argued that you
need the best players you have on the pitch when you are competing in the
Champions League.55 This free market argument is typical for dominant players
in such an economic environment.
Conclusions
The Bosman Case created an open labour market in a win maximization environment
with separated product markets. This new reality for European football was totally
different than the American open labour market in profit maximizing leagues and
common product markets. At first, many sports economists adhered to the American
approach towards professional team sports and argued that opening the labour
market would have no effect on the distribution of talent. Despite early warnings
by other scholars in sports economics, European football can not been compared
with American leagues. They predicted a concentration of talent when teams
have to compete first in their own league to qualify for European competitions.
Besides the intra league competition, inter league competition became also
important.
The strong relation between turnover and sports success made that major
product markets gradually monopolized revenues so that they could attract better
talents. Therefore, inter league competition is linked with the market size of national
competitions. As a result Big 5 leagues evolved towards a near monopolisation of
European success. To express it in game theoretical terms, Big 5 leagues moved
to a leader position in a Stackelberg equilibrium. Stepping stone leagues and the
other leagues were moved into a followers position and noticed decreasing sports
successes.
While a direct econometric test of the impact of the Bosman Case on these
evolutions is left for further research, empirical evidence is available to demonstrate
the relevance of the issues at hand. Empirical data of World Cup 1994 and World
Cup 2006 showed us that since the Bosman Case an increased concentration of
talent in Big 5 leagues occurred. Next, using OLS regression, we confirm that
performances in UEFA competitions such as the Champions League and UEFA
demonstrate a decline in competitive balance between leagues. In other words
the opening of the labour market in separated product markets had a divergent
effect on professional football in Europe. Next to this, we see an increase in the
sports successes of (recently) oligarchic funded leagues such as Russia and
Ukraine.
____________________
55 Champions League - Benitez slams new rule, Eurosport, see http://uk.eurosport.yahoo.com/
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Sports economists have been defining both Walrasian and Nash equilibria
for several labour/product market combinations. We plead, however, to enrich
these neoclassical textbook applications with non tangible issues such as local
embedment and identity. The European White Paper on Sport56 recognized the
specificity of sports and argued that a common product market is not institutionalized
in the European way of looking at professional football. The problems with an
open labour market, which creates a concentration of player talent into some
leagues and teams stimulated the EU to recognize sports as something specific.
As a result, European professional football shall probably face increasing limitations
on the openness of the labour market in the years to come.
____________________
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